Implementability via protective equilibria

We present a notion of non-cooperative strategic equilibrium for games generated by social choice functions, and fully characterize the class of those functions which are directly implementable under this equilibrium concept. Correct preference revelation turns out to always be such an equilibrium for the games generated by this class of implementable functions.     

Reforming Food Subsidy Schemes: Estimating the Gains from Self-targeting in India

The paper uses the theoretical framework of the theory of tax reform to analyze whether a “small” change in an existing food subsidy program can be both welfare‐improving and revenue‐neutral. It shows how existing econometric methods can be adapted to estimate demand parameters even when household‐level data exhibit little price variation because the government controls food prices. The methodology is used to estimate welfare changes from shifting a rupee of subsidy on existing commodities to coarse cereals in the Indian public distribution system.     

Controlling Investment Decisions: Depreciation- and Capital Charges

This paper examines a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a divisional manager has superior information regarding the profitability of an investment project available to his division. The manager also contributes to the periodic operating cash flows of his division through personally costly effort. We demonstrate that it is optimal for the principal to delegate the investment decision and to base the manager's compensation on the residual income performance measure. Our analysis points to a class of depreciation rules and to a particular capital charge rate which together ensure that a profitable (unprofitable) project makes a positive (negative) contribution to residual income in every period. As a consequence, the compensation parameters for each period can be chosen freely so as to address the moral hazard problems without impacting the manager's investment incentives.     

Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms

We consider a simple case of team production, where a set of workers have to contribute a single input (say labour) and then share the joint output amongst themselves. Different incentive issues arise when the skills as well as the levels of effort expended by workers are not publicly observable. We study one of these issues in terms of a very simple model in which two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, supply effort inelastically. Thus, we assume away the problem of moral hazard in order to focus on that of adverse selection. We also consider a hierarchical structure of production in which the workers need to be organised in two tiers. We look for reward schemes which specify higher payments to workers who have been assigned to the top-level jobs when the principal detects no lies, distribute the entire output in all circumstances, and induce workers to revel their true abilities. We contemplate two scenarios. In the first one, each individual worker knows only her own type, while in the second scenario each worker also knows the abilities of all other workers. Our general conclusion is that the adverse selection problem can be solved in our context. However, the range of satisfactory reward schemes depends on the informational framework.     

Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games

We analyze the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over equilibria—the battle-of-the-sexes or the hawk–dove game are key examples. If one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria, efficient equilibria must be egalitarian. For finitely repeated games, and generic discount factors, there is a unique outcome path which ensures efficiency within the class of symmetric equilibria. This is also true for the infinitely repeated games if the players are sufficiently impatient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

Constraints in acquiring and utilizing directors' experience: An empirical study of new‐market entry in the pharmaceutical industry

In this study we provide evidence that firms considering entering new markets are more likely to appoint directors with experience in those markets; and subsequently, we show that directors' market experience increases the likelihood of new‐market entry. Moreover, we explore the presence of constraints in both, acquiring experienced directors and utilizing their experience. Specifically, we find that experienced directors are less likely to join firms with financial restatements in the recent past as well as firms with a lower status than the firms where they currently serve. In addition, we find that interlocking directors' experience is less likely to lead to new‐market entry for firms that lack new‐product development experience and that exhibit a high level of market overlap with interlocked firms. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Skilled-unskilled wage inequality and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a static three sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labor is mobile between a traded good sector and the non-traded good sector and unskilled labor is specific to another traded good sector. Capital is perfectly mobile among all these three sectors. We introduce involuntary unemployment equilibrium in both the labor markets and explain unemployment using efficiency wage hypothesis. We examine the effects of change in different factor endowments and prices of traded goods on the unemployment rates and on the skilled-unskilled relative wage. Also, we introduce Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution as a measure of wage income inequality; and show that a comparative static effect may force the skilled-unskilled relative wage and the Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution to move in opposite directions in the presence of unemployment.     

Loan recommender system for microfinance loans: Increasing efficiency to assist growth

A majority of the world's population does not have access to basic financial services. Therefore, financial inclusion is gaining attention from different governments, Non-governmental Organizations and private institutions. Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have made a significant impact in the field of financial inclusion. But this impact is just the tip of the iceberg and these institutions need to grow exponentially and have efficient processes to have a more meaningful impact. In this article we discuss the design and implementation of a decision support system to help the MFIs achieve that target. We discuss an adaptive loan recommender system that assists the MFIs in making a more informed decision and help them grow with minimum resources. The article also discusses the implementation of this system in one MFI in India and the observed impact and limitations of the system.     

Variations in the contractual terms of cooperative advertising contracts: An empirical investigation

Cooperative advertising arrangements between manufacturers and resellers contain two principal components in their payment schedules: a participation rate and an accrual rate. We analyze 2,156 cooperative advertising plans to see how they vary across consumer and industrial products, as well as between convenience and nonconvenience consumer products. We also study how participation and accrual rates vary by the level of manufacturer concentration across product categories. We find that both participation and accrual rates are higher for consumer products than for industrial products and within consumer products are higher for convenience products than for nonconvenience products. We find mixed results for the effect of manufacturer concentration on these rates. We discuss how these results are consistent with existing perspectives on cooperative advertising.